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The eastern oyster once provided major societal and ecosystem benefits, but these
benefits have been threatened in recent decades by large declines in oyster harvests.
In many areas, recovery of oyster aquaculture faces significant societal opposition and
spatial constraints limiting its ability to meet expectations regarding future food needs
and provision of ecosystem services. In Virginia, oyster aquaculture has begun to
expand, concurrent with an increase in subaqueous leased areas (over 130,000 acres of
grounds are currently leased). Though private leases must in theory be used for oyster
production, in practice, they can be held for other reasons, such as speculation or
intentional exclusion of others. These factors have led to large variation over time and
space in the use of leases in lower Chesapeake Bay; and privately leased grounds
are now thought to be underutilized for oyster production. This research examined
potential barriers to expansion of oyster aquaculture in Virginia. We first evaluated if a
lack of space was limiting industry expansion and quantified temporal and spatial trends
in the use and productivity of leases. Then, differences in used and non-used leases
were investigated in relation to variables thought to be related to “not in my backyard”
attitudes, congestion, speculation, local economic and environmental conditions. Finally,
the performance of the Virginia leasing system was compared with those in other states
along the U.S. East and Gulf Coasts. We found limited evidence for spatial constraints
on aquaculture leasing, but strong evidence for social and regulatory inefficiencies.
Although rates of lease use increased from 2006 to 2016, only 33% of leases were
ever used for oyster production and about 63% of leaseholders reported no commercial
harvests. Non-used leases tended to be smaller, and were found in more populated,
high-income regions, consistent with both speculative and exclusionary uses. Virginia
had the second lowest level of total production of cultured oysters per leased acre
among the states on the East and Gulf Coasts of the United States. These results
indicate that there is room for oyster aquaculture expansion in Virginia if societal,
regulatory, and economic barriers can be reduced or if existing leased areas are used
more efficiently.
Keywords: Crassostrea virginica, oyster aquaculture, Chesapeake Bay, spatial management, user conflicts
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INTRODUCTION
As of 2018, aquaculture continues to be the fastest growing food
production method worldwide and now represents more than
half of global human seafood consumption (Duarte et al., 2009;
FAO, 2018). Though not all forms of aquaculture are beneficial
for the environment (Naylor et al., 1998), marine bivalve
aquaculture, especially oysters, has been recognized as a win–
win for society and marine ecosystems as it provides ecosystem
services such as water filtration and provision of habitat while
also producing low greenhouse gas emissions and efficiently
utilizing primary production (Coen et al., 2007; Grabowski and
Peterson, 2007; Duarte et al., 2009; Alleway et al., 2019; Ray
et al., 2019). As delicacies, marine bivalves constitute today
about 60% of marine and coastal aquaculture production (Science
Advice for Policy by European Academies [SAPEA], 2017; FAO,
2018). However, increases in seafood demand and improvements
in technology used for shellfish aquaculture are expected to
further intensify pressure on already crowded near-shore coastal
environments in coming years (Halpern et al., 2008; Shumway,
2011). Although the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
identifies the United States as one of the most prominent nations
for marine aquaculture development in terms of coastline length
and exclusive economic zone area (Kapetsky et al., 2013), its
contribution to domestic demand is believed to be far below its
potential (Knapp and Rubino, 2016). One identified reason is
that coastal aquaculture faces significant social opposition and
competition for space (Knapp, 2012; Froehlich et al., 2017).
Aquaculture intensification in crowded areas may be perceived
as a threat to recreational and amenity services (Gibbs, 2009) and
exacerbate spatial conflicts between stakeholders (Whitmarsh
and Palmieri, 2008). Gibbs (2009) suggests that social carrying
capacity, which refers to the space dedicated to aquaculture that
the local community is willing to accept (Inglis et al., 2000), may
become the main constraint to aquaculture industry growth in
industrialized countries such as the United States. This paper
looks at recent trends and drivers of growth in oyster aquaculture
to identify possible societal, management, or spatial limits to
expansion of the sector in Virginia, as well as more broadly.
Commercial fisheries for the eastern oyster (Crassostrea
virginica) have existed in the United States since the 1600s
(Ingersoll, 1881), and have historically played a major cultural
and economic role in communities bordering coastal estuaries
of the U.S. seaboard (Kirby, 2004; Keiner, 2009; Kennedy, 2018).
Nowhere is this more apparent than in Chesapeake Bay, where
oyster production from private leases in Virginia in the 1950s
averaged ∼16 million lbs/year (Haven et al., 1978; Figure 1).
Nevertheless, oyster production in the Chesapeake and elsewhere
has experienced a dramatic decline over the last several decades
due to a combination of overfishing, habitat destruction, and
disease (Rothschild et al., 1994; Kirby, 2004; Beck et al., 2011).
Harvests in Virginia during the early 2000s represented only
∼2.5% of the 1950s average (maximum of 0.4 million lbs/year
from 1995 to 2005) (Figure 1). The consequences of this decline
on local watermen (colloquial term for fishers) and fishing
communities have been severe, and growth in oyster production
has the potential to yield substantial economic, environmental,
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FIGURE 1 | Commercial oyster production on private leases (plain dark line)
and area held in private leases (red dashed line) in Virginia. Data from 1930 to
1974 were extracted from Haven et al. (1978); data from 1974 to 2016 were
provided by VMRC. Data for total leased area are not readily available for the
period 1975–2006, but values are known to be low due to high disease
prevalence and low harvests in the region.

and cultural benefits (Keiner, 2009; Paolisso and Dery, 2010).
Oyster production has begun to rebound since the mid-2000s,
reaching ∼2.5 million lbs in 2016. This growth is due to
an increased demand on newly developed, disease-resistant,
hatchery-raised oyster strains, and the expansion of intensive
oyster aquaculture (Bosch et al., 2010; Frank-Lawale et al., 2014;
Murray and Hudson, 2015). In Virginia, oyster harvests are
divided between two types of grounds: (1) public Baylor grounds,
consisting of the most productive oyster beds evaluated by the
Baylor survey in 1896 and designated for the public use (242,905
ac1 or 983 km2 statewide), and (2) private grounds, where leased
areas are granted to an individual or a company for their exclusive
use for shellfish collection and propagation, for a period of at
least 10 years (Santopietro and Shabman, 1992). Though both
areas are defined and permitted by the Virginia Marine Resource
Commission (VMRC), that agency only carries out significant
resource management in public grounds. Private leases have
long been advocated as an effective tool for increasing oyster
yields (Alford, 1973; Agnello and Donnelley, 1975) while also
incentivizing sustainable practices (Beck et al., 2004). There
has been a considerable increase in privately leased area from
81,545 ac (330 km2 ) in the 2000s (Mason, 2008) to 139,120 ac
(563 km2 ) in 2017 (Figure 2). Despite the large amount of area
leased to date, production remains historically low.
Chesapeake Bay (Figure 2) is the largest estuary in the
United States and is used by a diverse group of stakeholders
for recreational, commercial, and government activities (e.g.,
boating, fishing, swimming, military training, and security).
1

The authors chose to primarily use acres instead of squared kilometers given the
ubiquity of this unit of measure in U.S. aquaculture management and industry.
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FIGURE 2 | Study area with each system in the lower Chesapeake Bay indicated. Only the Virginia waters of the Potomac River are shown (in dark gray). Private
leases on the Atlantic coast of Eastern Shore (dotted pattern) were excluded from analyses.
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and environmental conditions. Finally, we compared average
productivity of leased grounds for 2017 across states on the East
Coast and Gulf Coast of the United States. This comprehensive
analysis of temporal and spatial trends in oyster lease use, drivers
behind this use, and leasing system performance, is needed to
fully understand current trends, predict future patterns, and
identify impediments to growth in oyster production in the
Chesapeake Bay as well as more broadly.

About 18 million people live within the Bay’s watershed
and the population is expected to reach 20 million by 2030
(Chesapeake Bay Program, 2017). The Hampton Roads region
of Virginia, which boarders the southern extent of Chesapeake
Bay, is particularly densely populated, with a population of
1.7 million that includes the cities of Virginia Beach, Norfolk,
Hampton, Newport News, and Portsmouth. Conflict with oyster
aquaculturists is common in heavily populated areas in the region
such as in the Lynnhaven River, where aquaculture infrastructure
(e.g., cages) has been argued to be unsightly and potentially
dangerous for recreational activities. Other coastal property
owners worry about the industry’s effect on property access and
value (Knapp and Rubino, 2016; Evans et al., 2017). Many think
that availability for lease space now constrains the expansion of
oyster aquaculture in lower Chesapeake Bay (Mason, 2008; B.
Stagg, VMRC, pers. comm.).
Although privately leased areas in Virginia waters of
Chesapeake Bay represent an important part of overall oyster
harvests (60%), there are a number of reasons to believe that
harvests could potentially be far greater. In theory, commercial
leases larger than 1/2 acre must be used for “planting or
propagating [of] oysters” as stated in the Virginia Code, Chapter
6, 28.2-603. However, privately leased grounds are now thought
to be significantly underutilized for oyster production (Mason,
2008; Bosch et al., 2010). It is widely hypothesized—but
poorly demonstrated—that factors other than potential oyster
production are important drivers of the recent increase in leased
area. With the lowest annual lease rate in the United States
($1.50/acre/year), there is little cost to holding a lease and
individuals may apply for a lease without the intention of using
it for oyster culture in the immediate future (Mason, 2008). Lease
acquisition in Virginia may be driven by the desire of waterfront
landowners for esthetic purposes or to impede development of
oyster farming “in their backyard” (“Not in my backyard” attitude
is hereafter referred to as NIMBY after Dear, 1992). Speculative
leasing of areas with the intent of future resale at a profit, without
productive use, is also suspected to contribute to the increase
in leases (Mason, 2008). Increased aquaculture development in
Virginia might therefore face limitations related to social factors
rather than the biophysical environment. Despite the positive
trend in production recently observed, these challenges could
be key constraints to further industry expansion, and although
considered to be underutilized, the scope, spatial scale, and
temporal trends in recent oyster lease use and productivity have
not been investigated.
The primary goals of this study were to quantify temporal and
spatial trends in the use and productivity of private oyster ground
leases in the lower Chesapeake Bay and explore potential impacts
of environmental, social, and management contexts. Specifically,
we first examined if lack of space was limiting industry expansion.
To do so, we analyzed temporal and spatial saturation levels
with respect to leased grounds in the main river systems of the
Chesapeake Bay. Second, temporal and spatial trends of lease
productivity (i.e., pounds of oysters per leased acreage) and lease
use were examined. Then, we investigated how used and nonused leases differed across variables thought to be related to
NIMBY attitudes, spatial congestion, speculation, local economic

Frontiers in Marine Science | www.frontiersin.org

MATERIALS AND METHODS
Study Area
Virginia waters of the Chesapeake Bay have a total surface area
of 1,976,843 ac (8,000 km2 ) and are classified by VMRC into
seven systems: the James River, York River, Rappahannock River,
Potomac River, the main bay, miscellaneous tributaries (i.e.,
smaller tributaries found along the bay), and the Atlantic coast
of Eastern Shore (Figure 2).

Available Data
Statistical analyses of spatial saturation, trends and drivers of
lease use and productivity, and comparisons of used and nonused leases were carried out using a combination of data
from VIMS, VMRC, Virginia Department of Health (VDH),
NOAA/NOS estuarine bathymetry digital elevation model, and
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (Table 1). Data on oyster
leases, harvests, environmental conditions, and surrounding
socio-economic conditions were stored in a spatially-explicit
PostgreSQL/PostGIS database (PostgreSQL10.9, PostGIS 2.4.4).

Leases and Corresponding Harvest Data
Polygons of leased grounds in Virginia existing during the
period 2006–2016 (Figure 3) were available publicly through
the VMRC’s Chesapeake Bay Map (accessed on 2017/06/30;
archived maps also available)2 . Information on individual leases
includes the type of lease (e.g., commercial or not), its assignment
and termination dates, and the leaseholder’s name and mailing
address (i.e., physical address or PO Box). Leaseholders are
required to submit annual reports on commercial harvest. Time
series of annual oyster harvest per lease from 2006 to 2016 were
provided by VMRC, which collects these data for management
and monitoring purposes. Harvest data were separated by lease
identification number, gear, and year.

Environmental Data
In order to assess the availability by major river system and year of
remaining areas that could potentially be leased, several habitat,
environmental, and management variables were combined to
define suitable and not-suitable areas for oyster production. Notsuitable areas included Baylor grounds, i.e., natural oyster beds
reserved for the public use, and public clamming grounds, for
which GIS polygons were available publicly through the VMRC’s
Chesapeake Bay Map. Shellfish condemnation zones not-suitable
for oyster growth, nor for human consumption, were provided
2

4

https://webapps.mrc.virginia.gov/public/maps/chesapeakebay_map.php

March 2020 | Volume 7 | Article 53

Beckensteiner et al.

Barriers to Oyster Aquaculture Expansion

TABLE 1 | Variables used in the analysis, their spatial and temporal coverage, and data sources by type.
Data type

Variables

Temporal coverage

Source

Lease

Leased ground polygons

1950–2017

Virginia Marine Resource Commission

Fisheries

Annual oyster harvests

2006–2016

Virginia Marine Resource Commission (by leased ground)

Environmental

Shellfish condemnation zones

2017

Virginia Department of Health

Baylor grounds

2017

Virginia Marine Resource Commission

Public clamming grounds

2017

Virginia Marine Resource Commission

Bathymetry

2017

NOAA/NOS estuarine bathymetry digital elevation model (raster, resolution 10 m)

Socioeconomic

Submerged Aquatic Vegetation

2003–2016

Virginia Institute of Marine Science

Salinity

2000–2014

VIMS, ChesROMS-ECB model (mean resolution 1.7 km)

Total adjusted gross income

2006–2016

U.S. Internal Revenue Services (by ZIP code)

Number of tax returns

2006–2016

U.S. Internal Revenue Services (by ZIP code)

Number of tax exemptions

2006–2016

U.S. Internal Revenue Services (by ZIP code)

by VDH for 2017 and comprised zones where no harvesting at
any time is allowed, zones where harvest is restricted from April
to October (marina-based restriction), and zones corresponding
to upstream tidal waters where salinities are too low to
sustain continuous annual oyster growth. Deep waters were
also considered not-suitable areas for oyster production because
deeper waters can have low dissolved oxygen concentrations in
the summer (Theuerkauf and Lipcius, 2016) and involve higher
risk, access, and technical costs for oyster culture. Bathymetric
data of the Chesapeake Bay were obtained from a NOAA/NOS
estuarine bathymetry digital elevation model, with a resolution
of 10 m (National Centers for Environmental Information, 2017).
VMRC does not allow leasing of grounds covered by submerged
aquatic vegetation (SAV beds) and typically considers the past
five years of SAV distribution when reviewing lease applications.
SAV beds provide important ecological services for the Bay, such
as structured habitat and food, improvements to water quality,
and stabilization of bottom sediments (Thayer et al., 1975);
however, SAV competes for shallow habitat with cultured oysters
(Wagner et al., 2012). The GIS polygons of all densities of SAV
coverage (i.e., very sparse to dense coverage) from 2003 to 2016
were provided by VIMS (D. Wilcox, VIMS, pers. comm.).
Because salinity can affect oyster growth, spring bottom
salinity from 2003 to 20143 (March to June) were derived from
an estuarine biogeochemical model, ChesROMS-ECB, developed
for the Chesapeake Bay and having an average grid resolution
of 1.7 km (Feng et al., 2015). We compared lease use according
to salinity: higher salinity allows higher oyster growth and
reproductive rates, but is also a surrogate for increased disease
prevalence (Shumway, 2011).

were used to create proxies for per household income, household
and local population size. These data were available by ZIP code
from individual income tax statistics provided by the U.S. IRS4 .

Data Processing
Not-Suitable Areas for Leasing and Saturation Index
Not-suitable areas for leasing comprised Baylor grounds, clam
grounds, condemned zones, and deep waters. A cutoff of 8 m
was used from the bathymetric data to exclude deeper water
areas (i.e., 99th percentile of maximum depth observed per lease,
consistent with Carlozo, 2014 for which a depth of 7.62 m was
used). Not-suitable areas were removed from each system to
calculate a constant leasable area per system, leasable_areasys
(Figure 4). SAV grounds for the four years preceding and up to a
given year were considered as not leasable for the given year per
system and were defined as SAV_areay,sys . An annual saturation
rate per system, sy,sys , was calculated as the union of all leased
areas (including all leases, i.e., riparian5 leases and commercial
leases), leased_areay,sys , and all SAV grounds for a given year
divided by leasable area (i.e., Chesapeake Bay area excluding
Baylor grounds, clams grounds, shellfish condemnation zones,
and deep waters):
sy,sys

S
leased_areay,sys + tt−4 SAV_areay,sys
.
=
leasable_areasys

(1)

This saturation index, bounded between 0 and 1, was used
to examine space limitation for oyster industry expansion as a
function of time.

Socio-Economic Data

Lease Exploitation Indices

Previous studies in British Columbia found that those opposed to
aquaculture industry expansion tended to be wealthy and lived
near the waterfront (Shafer et al., 2010; D’Anna and Murray,
2015). Therefore, we expected leases in more populated areas
with higher incomes to be used less, plausibly obtained to exclude
oyster aquaculture. Total adjusted gross income, number of
personal tax returns, and number of personal tax exemptions

We categorized oyster harvests into intensive or extensive
aquaculture based on the utilized gear. Extensive, on-bottom,
aquaculture refers to the deposition, or planting, of oyster shells
or live seed oysters (spat on shell, or cultch) on the bottom
for later harvest. Extensive aquaculture gear includes scrapes,

3

4

https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-income-tax-statisticszip-code-data-soi
5
Leases less than 1/2 acre for non-commercial oyster gardening.

ChesROMS-ECB data was only available for the 2003–2014 period.
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FIGURE 3 | Leases analyzed during the period 2006–2016 (in green). Other leases excluded from the dataset (in red) included riparian leases, leases on the Atlantic
coast of the Eastern Shore, those in condemned zones (hatched red areas), and those that were never more than 2 years old.

patent tongs, dredges, picks, and bull rakes6 . Intensive, offbottom, aquaculture refers to the production of high density, high
value, cultch-free oysters over a small area. Intensive aquaculture
gear includes bottom cages, implanted racks, bags, water column
cages, net pens, and floats. The harvest dataset was combined with
the lease dataset to create two indices of lease exploitation: (1)
use, ui,y , which was a binary variable, equal to 1 if any harvest
6

was reported on lease i in year y and equal to 0 otherwise, and (2)
productivity, prodi,y,t , which was the oyster harvest reported for
a lease i in year y and aquaculture type t (extensive or intensive),
divided by lease i’s area (in acres).

Selection of Lease Areas for Analysis
As further analyses were focused on lease use and productivity,
certain zones or leases were not considered to be available for
production, such as shellfish condemnation zones and riparian

Oysters collected by hand were also considered extensive aquaculture.
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FIGURE 4 | Areas that were not suitable for oyster production were comprised of Baylor grounds (A), clams grounds (B), shellfish condemnation zones (C), and
deep waters (D). These were subtracted from the mainstem area of Chesapeake Bay to produce leasable area (E). Leasable area was considered constant from
2006 to 2016 while SAV grounds (F) changed over time, but all years’ beds are plotted here. Data sources for each area are indicated in bottom left corner in
parentheses.

leases. As commercial oyster production in these areas is either
banned, unlikely, or highly variable, they were eliminated before
carrying out further analyses (Figure 3). Furthermore, since
oysters may require 2–3 years to reach market size (76 mm
shell length) (Harding, 2007) and leaseholders often need time
to build financial capital and production infrastructure (B. Stagg,
VMRC, pers. comm.), lease use and production might not be
expected during the initial years of a lease. Therefore, all data
from the initial three years after a lease was granted were removed
from analyses on use and productivity (e.g., data from a lease
created in 2005 were excluded for analyses for the years 2006 and
2007). Finally, leases on the Atlantic coast of the Eastern Shore,
typically used for clam aquaculture (Figure 1), were excluded
from our dataset.

Variables were aggregated or averaged per lease for the full
study period of 2006–2016. Mean bathymetry of each lease
was calculated from the NOAA bathymetry layer, and mean
salinity was derived from the ChesROMS model. If a lease
was not covered by the ChesROMS grid (i.e., in upstream
areas of small tributaries), we extrapolated the salinity value
from the nearest ChesROMS grid cell within 1.7 km of that
lease (size of one grid cell). If a lease overlapped with several
grid cells, we assigned the weighted sum of the value of those
grid cells to the lease. Finally, mean distance to the nearest
SAV grounds from 2003 to 2016 was calculated for each lease.
As indicated above, the VMRC does not allow leasing of
grounds with SAV beds considering the past five years of SAV
distribution. Higher salinity and shallower bathymetry were
expected to be key factors in the use of a lease. Proximity
to SAV grounds was expected to have a negative impact on
the use of a lease. SAV beds are thought to be expanding in
leasable areas and VMRC requires growers to remove intensive
gears from areas covered by SAV, though the lease is not
revoked (Wagner et al., 2012; Patrick and Weller, 2015; B. Stagg,
VMRC, pers. comm.).

Indexes for Comparisons of Used and Non-used
Leases
Differences in used and non-used leases, defined here as used
(or not) once over 2006 to 2016, were investigated in relation to
variables thought to be related to “NIMBY” attitudes, congestion,
speculation, local economic and environmental conditions.

Frontiers in Marine Science | www.frontiersin.org

7

March 2020 | Volume 7 | Article 53

Beckensteiner et al.

Barriers to Oyster Aquaculture Expansion

peer pressure, fear of encroachment, network effects). Potential
congestion or agglomeration effects were examined through four
variables: within a 1 km buffer around each examined lease, we
counted per year the number of other leases and fraction of
leased acreage owned by the same leaseholder, and the number
of other leases and fraction of leased acreage owned by different
leaseholders. Those four variables were then averaged for the full
study period of 2006–2016.

Proxies for NIMBY attitudes were assessed using IRS socioeconomic data as well as proximities of leases to leaseholder
addresses (Dear, 1992) and to the shore. Population density
was calculated as the population for a given ZIP code (number
of personal tax exemptions) divided by its area. Per household
income was calculated as total adjusted gross income divided
by number of returns and was adjusted for inflation. Average
income, household, and population density by ZIP code were
averaged for the 2006–2016 period (Supplementary Figure S1).
We then assigned to each lease the value from the nearest ZIP
code area. Only 52% of leaseholder addresses in our dataset
corresponded to an identifiable physical address as determined by
a geolocation rating score less than or equal to 10 (recommended
cutoff value7 ). Unidentifiable addresses were mostly PO Boxes.
Therefore, distances to leaseholder ZIP code area centroids
were calculated for every lease as a proxy for proximity to
leaseholder’s home (i.e., we assumed that the ZIP code of PO
Boxes corresponded to the ZIP code of the leaseholder’s physical
address). We expected leases in more populated and higherincome areas, nearby leaseholder homes (i.e., smaller distances),
and closer to the shore to be less intensively used due to some
leases being kept to impede oyster aquaculture activities (i.e.,
resulting from NIMBY behaviors). A binary variable named
“only_one_lease” was created and equal to 1 if a leaseholder
had only one lease in the studied period, or equal to 0 if
she/he had more than one lease. Leaseholders owning only one
small lease were thought to potentially be those obtaining leases
to exclude others.
Speculation, i.e., acquisition of a lease for future use or
future resale at a higher price, has been suggested as another
social behavior that could affect oyster lease use and result in
lower efficiency of the leasing system (Mason, 2008). Given the
observed increase in leased area in recent years (indicative of
increased demand for leases), one might expect that leaseholders
would buy more leases than needed, with those obtained later
being more likely to be bought for investment purposes instead of
immediate use in oyster production. We assessed this possibility
with two variables. First, leases owned by a leaseholder from 2006
to 2016 were ranked according to their date of acquisition. Rank
of purchase was then divided by the total number of leases owned.
Second, leased areas held by a leaseholder were cumulatively
summed according to their establishment date, and this sum was
divided by the total leased area owned by the leaseholder. Both
variables were therefore bounded between 0 and 1, with lower
values representing leases or leased area obtained earlier on and
higher values representing leases or leased area bought later.
Finally, an additional local feature, congestion of the area
around a lease, was developed to potentially observe differences
between used and non-used leases. One might think that multiple
leases surrounding a productive lease, all owned by a single
leaseholder, could be utilized as a buffer against poachers or other
aquaculturists (B. Stagg, VMRC, pers. comm.); this central lease
would then be more likely to be used. Furthermore, if a lease
is surrounded by leases from different leaseholders, it might be
expected that this lease will be more intensively used (e.g., due to
7

Statistical Analyses
Beta Regression for Saturation Analysis
A beta regression model (Ferrari and Cribari-Neto, 2004)
was used to evaluate the saturation of Virginia waters of the
Chesapeake Bay by leased areas over time and systems:

g µsys,y = β 1 · X 1 + εsys, y .
(2)
In (Eq. 2), the response variable was saturation, ssys,y , defined
in the Section “Not-Suitable Areas for Leasing and Saturation
Index” as the proportion of a given system’s leasable area
occupied by leased areas or SAV, for year y. The dependent
variable was continuous, restricted to the unit interval (0,1), and
beta-distributed, ssys,y ∼B (µsys,y ,8) with µsys,y its mean and 8,
a constant precision parameter; the link function used, g(.), was
logit. X1 was a (k × 1) vector of observations on k covariates
consisting of: year, year2 (its quadratic transformation to test
for non-linear trends), system intercepts, and the interaction
terms year × system and year2 × system. β1 was a (1 × k)
vector of regression coefficients to be estimated and εsys,y
was the error term. Parameter estimation was performed by
maximum likelihood in R (R Core Team, 2018) with the
betareg package (Cribari-Neto and Zeileis, 2010). Beta regression
parameter estimates correspond to the change in log-odds
of the response variable, which here was system saturation.
Differences between consecutive year predictions were used
in the text to inform percent changes in saturation rate
for a given year.

Hurdle-Style Model for Trends in Lease Use and
Productivity
A two-part regression model, similar to a Hurdle model
(Mullahy, 1986), was used to estimate temporal and spatial trends
of lease use and productivity, the impact of lease age on use and
productivity, and the impact of aquaculture practices (extensive,
intensive) on productivity:


p(ui,y = 1)
ln
= β2 · X 2 + δu, i + εy,t ,
(3)
1 − p(ui,y = 1)
ln(prodi,y,t ) = β3 · X 3 + δprod,i + εi,y,t .

In (Eq. 3), we specified the probability lease i would be
used in year y to be a function of X2 , a (m × 1) vector of
observations on m covariates: year, lease age, system intercepts,
and interactions between year and system. β2 was a (1 × m)
vector of unknown regression coefficients. In (Eq. 4), the
dependent variable was the log-transformed productivity per
lease i with non-zero harvest, observed for year y, with gear

https://postgis.net/docs/Geocode.html
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from aquaculture type t. The set of covariates for (Eq. 4)
was the same as for (Eq. 3) with the addition of the
covariate aquaculture type, specifying whether the harvest was
from intensive or extensive aquaculture. We controlled for
heterogeneity across leases in the estimations of (Eq. 3) and
(Eq. 4) by including a random effect for lease i, δu,i , and
δprod,i in (Eq. 3) and (Eq. 4), respectively. εi,y and εi,y,t were
the error terms. We also ran these two models with random
effects for leases nested within leaseholder to evaluate the
amount of unexplained variance in lease use and productivity
attributable to individual leaseholders. Coefficient estimation
was performed by restricted maximum likelihood with the lme4
package (functions glmer and lmer, Bates et al., 2015). Marginal
coefficient of determination, R2 m , and conditional coefficient
of determination, R2 c , describing the proportion of variance
explained by fixed factors only and by the entire model, including
random factors, respectively, were estimated for the mixed effects
models with the MuMIn package (Nakagawa and Schielzeth,
2013). Coefficients were transformed in the text into percent
changes in use probability for a given change in the predictor
eβ·1x
variable using the following formula: %1y = 100 · 1+e
β·1x − 0.5;
or into percent changes in productivity for a given change in
the predictor
 variable using the following formula: %1y = 100 ·
eβ·1x − 1 .

oysters per sack for Texas (see Table 5, conversions provided by
the individual state management authorities).

Comparisons of Used and Non-used Leases

System Saturation Analysis

Comparisons of used and non-used leases’ characteristics (i.e.,
proxy variables related to either NIMBY, congestion, speculation,
economic or environmental conditions) over the period 2006–
2016 were performed with the non-parametric Wilcoxon ranksum test (Mann and Whitney, 1947) and the Ansari–Bradley
dispersion test (Ansari and Bradley, 1960). The Wilcoxon ranksum test is used for comparing the central tendencies of two
independent samples, whereas the Ansari–Bradley test evaluates
equivalence of dispersions. A Pearson’s chi-square test was used
to assess the independence between lease use and the binary
variable “Only_one_lease” to determine if non-used leases were
most often observed for leaseholders who had only one lease.

The annual saturation of Chesapeake Bay’s leasable systems by
leased areas was analyzed over time (Figure 5) and assessed with
a beta regression (Table 2). In 2016, 40–67% of leasable space was
occupied by either oyster leases or SAV (with the exception of
the mainstem of the Chesapeake Bay, in which only 10% of the
leasable area was leased) (Figure 5). Changes in leased area drove
changes in saturation rates as SAV occupied a relatively small and
constant fraction of non-leased but leasable ground (7.0 ± 0.4%).
High values for the pseudo-R2 (0.98) and precision parameter
8 (463.4) of the model indicated that the fit to the data was
strong (Table 2; Cribari-Neto and Zeileis, 2010). Every system
had an increasing saturation rate over time but rates differed by
system. Leased area in the miscellaneous tributaries (base level),
the Rappahannock River, and the Chesapeake Bay increased
at similar
3.5% per year [estimated as
 rates of approximately


RESULTS
Private Oyster Leases in Virginia
In the last decade, Virginia has seen a significant increase in
subaqueous leased area of ∼70%, leading to what is currently
the largest amount of area leased since the system began more
than 100 years ago. The total number of leases (including riparian
leases) in 2017 was 5,592 with a total acreage of 139,120 ac
(563 km2 , held by 2,523 leaseholders), exceeding the previous
historical maximum of 133,931 ac (542 km2 ) achieved in 1966
(Figure 1). The number of leases analyzed in our study from
2006 to 2016 is, however, lower since we have excluded leases
in shellfish condemnation zones and from the Atlantic coast
system, riparian leases, and leases less than three years old, as
oyster production in these areas was unlikely (Figure 3). We
therefore analyzed 3,340 leases covering 68,942 ac (279 km2 ),
which were held by 1,276 leaseholders. Average lease size was
24.7 ac (0.1 km2 ), ranging from 0.1 ac (397 m2 ) to 1,927 ac
(7.8 km2 ). Over the studied decade, ∼40% of leaseholders had
only one lease, while 17% had more than five leases.

Lease Productivity Across U.S. East and
Gulf Coast States

0.14

e
100 · 1+e
as interactions between year and system
0.14 − 0.5
were not significant, p > 0.05]. Significant quadratic interaction
terms indicated that the rate of increase in saturation was
itself increasing over the time period of the study in the more
populated James River (ranging from 1.3% from 2006 to 2007,
to 5.8% from 2015 to 2016) and York River (from 0.7% to
3.9%). However, saturation was increasing at a decreasing rate in
the Potomac River, ranging from 5.6% to −2.9% for 2006 and
2016, respectively.

As oyster aquaculture management and historical contexts differ
along the Eastern and Gulf Coasts of the United States, private
leasing systems and aquaculture production were examined
across states to evaluate the performance of Virginia’s lease
system. Data on total aquaculture production for oysters, farm
gate value, leased acreage, and number of leases for 2017
from U.S. East and Gulf Coast states with significant oyster
aquaculture industries were obtained from a variety state agency
administrators and industry annual reports (detailed source data
found in Table 5). Lease productivity for 2017 was calculated
as total production in oyster pieces divided by total leased
area. These data were not differentiated by production method.
When production was provided in bushels or sacks, we used
the following conversions: 300 oysters per bushel for Maryland
and North Carolina; 400 oysters per bushel for Virginia; and 250

Frontiers in Marine Science | www.frontiersin.org

Lease Use Analysis
Actively used private leases were defined as those leases with any
reported oyster harvest for a given year. Active leaseholders were
defined as those leaseholders with an actively used lease in a given
year. Percentages of active leases, leased areas, and leaseholders
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FIGURE 5 | Saturation of systems’ waters by leased areas over year (gray lines) and overall saturation (bold line). Saturation for the mainstem of Chesapeake Bay
was removed from total calculation as this area is distinctly dissimilar to other systems considered.

initially higher in 2006 as indicated by its intercept value
(coefficient −2.89, the highest of all systems; Supplementary
Figure S2A). Interestingly, recent leases were more likely to
be used and the probability of a lease being used decreased
by 0.5% per additional year of lease age (note the small
magnitude for this estimate compared to that for year, suggesting
its minor effect).
Average productivity per year, defined as the sum of oyster
pounds harvested per unit area, fluctuated over time between
143.9 and 295.2 lbs/ac (Supplementary Figure S2B). Results
from the linear mixed effects model of lease productivity
indicated that system, year, and some interactions between
year and system had significant effects on productivity in used
leases. There was an increase of productivity of 5.44% per year
in miscellaneous tributaries as well as the Rappahannock and
York rivers (interactions between system and year were not
significant, p > 0.05; Table 3). The Potomac and James rivers,
as well as the mainstem of the Bay, had increases of productivity
per year at rates threefold higher (∼15.37%, 17.23%, 14.00%,
respectively, p < 0.05; note the large range of starting productivity
values, Supplementary Figure S2B). Counterintuitively, lease
age did not significantly affect productivity, nor did the type of
aquaculture utilized for the harvest (Table 3).

were calculated per year over all systems (Figure 6). In 2006, only
3.5% of individual leases, 9.7% of all leased areas, and 4.7% of
leaseholders were active. Active lease proportions increased over
time but were still low in 2016, when 19.1% of leases, 31.9% of
leased areas, and 26.9% of leaseholders were active (Figure 6).
Over the entire decade, 33.4% of leases, 44.3% of leased area, and
36.8% of leaseholders were active for at least one year.

Hurdle-Style Model for Use and
Productivity
Results from the linear mixed effects model of lease use
indicated that system, year, and some interactions between
system and year had significant effects on the probability of
a lease being actively used. There was an overall increase of
use over time in every system (Table 3). The probability of
a lease being actively used increased on average by 8.42%
per year in the Potomac River (p < 0.05), by 6.76% in the
Rappahannock River, York River, miscellaneous tributaries, and
Chesapeake Bay (interactions were not significant, p > 0.05),
and by 3.15% in the James River (p < 0.05, Table 3). Though
the rate of increasing lease use in the James River was less
than half that in other systems, use rates in this system were
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TABLE 2 | Results of the beta regression model estimating saturation rates per
year and system.
Factor

Estimate

Std. error

p-value

Signif.

Year

0.140

0.034

3.16E-5

***

Year × Potomac

0.121

0.048

0.011

*

Year × Rappahannock

0.006

0.050

0.897

Year × York

−0.120

0.047

0.011

*

Year × James

−0.111

0.048

0.021

*

0.047

0.073

0.517

Year2

−0.004

0.003

0.255

Year2 × Potomac

−0.016

0.005

4.24E-4

Year2 × Rappahannock

−0.003

0.005

0.489

Year2 × York

0.012

0.005

0.010

*

Year2 × James

0.015

0.005

0.001

**

Year × Ches. Bay

Year2

× Ches. Bay

−0.009

8

463.39

Pseudo-R2

0.9826

0.007

0.199

80.61

8.99E-9

***

FIGURE 6 | Percentages of used leases, used leased area, and active
leaseholders per year over all systems.

***

and expected negative relationships with lease use; i.e., non-used
leases tended to be obtained later or contributed to a higher
cumulative leased area (p-values < 0.05, Table 4 and Figure 7).
Thus, in light of this result, non-used leases tended to be younger
(p-value < 0.05). Used leases were observed more in congested
waters, or closer to Baylor grounds. Finally, environmental
variables were also significantly different between used and nonused leases (e.g., median salinity in used leases was 12.52 ppt
whereas it was 14.56 ppt in non-used leases). Surprisingly, lower
salinities and greater depths were associated with higher rates of
lease use. Lastly, non-used leases were found in close proximity to
SAV. In summary, non-used leases were smaller, in less congested
areas, obtained later on, in more populated, high-income regions,
and in shallower and more saline waters.

Reference level of system for interaction terms is miscellaneous tributaries. Beta
estimates are the additional increase (or decrease if estimate is negative) in the logodds of the response saturation. Differences between consecutive year predictions
were used in the text to inform percent changes in saturation rate for a given year.
Significance is denoted by: p < 0.001 = “***”, p < 0.01 = “**”, p < 0.05 = “*”.
8 is a constant precision parameter. Pseudo-R2 represents the goodness of fit
test for the regression. System intercept parameters are not presented but are
available upon request.

Differences between conditional R2 c and marginal R2 m
showed that 46% of variability in lease use, and 52% of
variability in productivity, resulted from heterogeneity across
leases (Table 3). When the same models were run with random
effects for leases nested within leaseholders, similar results were
observed in terms of coefficient estimates and their significance
(results from this supplementary model are available upon
request). The difference between R2 c and R2 m was slightly
higher (e.g., 53.8% of variability in lease use, Supplementary
Table S1), indicating that adding a leaseholder random effect only
had a minor impact on unexplained variance (not particularly
surprising as 40% of leaseholders only had one lease).

Lease Productivity Across U.S. East and
Gulf Coast States
The number of leases and productivity (oysters pieces/acre)
were highly variable between states of the U.S. East Coast
and Gulf of Mexico (i.e., spanning two orders of magnitude,
Table 5). Virginia was the third largest producer of oysters
from private leases in 2017 (38,900,000 oysters) and had
the second largest leased area (125,928 ac). However, the
state recorded the second lowest productivity (309 oysters/ac,
incorporating non-used leases; Table 5). Massachusetts had
the highest production (47,849,698 oysters) and productivity
(36,836 oysters/ac) while Louisiana and Connecticut, similarly
to Virginia, were characterized by high production levels but
low productivity per acre. The top-three states that recorded the
highest level of productivity per acre had on average smaller leases
(mean lease size of 5 ac) than the remaining states with lower
productivities per acre (mean lease size of 24 ac).

Comparison of Used and Non-used
Leases
We investigated how several proxies for local economic, social,
and environmental conditions differed between used and nonused leases (over the entire period 2006–2016). Interestingly,
non-used leases tended to be smaller (Table 4 and Figure 7) and
leaseholders with non-used leases tended to have fewer, or only
one, lease (p-values < 0.05). Surprisingly, there was no difference
in the distance to shore for used and non-used leases, though
there was a significant difference between the variances of each
group (variance was lower for non-used leases) (Table 4). Used
leases tended to be slightly closer to leaseholder ZIP code (though
the effect was not highly significant; p-value = 0.09) but there was
greater variance in ZIP code distance for non-used leases. Nonused leases were more common, however, in more populated,
high-income regions (p-values < 0.05; Table 4 and Figure 7).
Variables related to speculation behavior exhibited significant
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This research analyzed the trends and drivers in the burgeoning
oyster aquaculture industry in Virginia on privately leased
grounds of Chesapeake Bay. We sought to identify possible
societal, regulatory, and spatial constraints on harvests of
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TABLE 3 | Annual lease use and productivity per systems with leases as a random effect in a mixed effects model.
Fixed effects

Y = use (1|0)
Estimate

Year
Lease age

Std. error

Y = ln(productivity)
Signif.

p-value

Estimate

Std. error

p-value

Signif.
**

0.272

0.017

<2E-16

***

0.053

0.020

0.007

−0.022

0.005

2.50E-5

***

−0.002

0.005

0.631

Misc. Tribs

−4.417

0.156

<2E-16

***

3.704

0.172

0.000

***

Potomac

−4.194

0.256

<2E-16

***

3.827

0.263

0.000

***

Rappahannock

−4.215

0.262

<2E-16

***

3.232

0.290

0.000

***

York

−4.860

0.381

<2E-16

***

3.232

0.290

<2E-14

***

James

−2.887

0.236

<2E-16

***

4.575

0.491

0.000

***

Ches. Bay

−3.882

0.230

<2E-16

***

2.639

0.221

0.000

***

0.068

0.032

0.031

*

0.090

0.036

0.013

*

−0.018

0.034

0.585

−0.030

0.039

0.450

Year × Potomac
Year × Rappahannock

0.021

0.049

0.659

−0.091

0.061

0.137

Year × James

Year × York

−0.146

0.031

2.66E-6

***

0.106

0.032

0.001

***

Year × Ches. Bay

−0.054

0.031

0.083

.

0.078

0.035

0.026

*

2.183

0.242

0.992

Aquaculture type
Random effects

Variance

Std. dev.

Variance

Std. dev.

Lease

6.002

2.450

1.974

1.405

R2

0.064

m

R2 c

0.099

0.522

0.617

Observations

23,426

2,663

Individual leases

3,340

994

Base level of system for interaction terms is miscellaneous tributaries. Logit link was utilized for the lease use model; therefore, estimates are the additional increase or
decrease in the log-odds of the response use (1 or 0). Coefficients were transformed in the text into percent changes in use probability for a given change in the predictor
eβ·1x
variable using the following formula: %1y = 100 · 1+e
β·1x − 0.5; or into percent changes in productivity for a given change in the predictor variable using the following

β·1x
formula: %1y = 100 · e
− 1 . Significance is denoted by: p < 0.001 = “***”, p < 0.01 = “**”, p < 0.05 = “*”, p < 0.1 = “.”. Marginal and conditional coefficients of
determination are respectively given by R2 m and R2 c . Delta-method approximation was used for the observation-level variance.

of dealing with these factors. This suggests that economic, as
opposed to spatial, factors may be the primary limitation for
expansion of oyster aquaculture into the mainstem of the bay.
If this is the case, then reductions in costs associated with
oyster aquaculture practices or increases in market demand
could lead industry to expand into areas that are currently not
economically viable.
From 2006 to 2016, only 33.4% of leases ever reported
oyster production. Leaseholders owning multiple leases often
operate in a rotational manner. This could partially explain
low annual utilization rates, though this is unlikely to explain
why a majority of leases remained not-used for the entire
11-year study period. Furthermore, we found only 36.8% of
individual leaseholders were active during the same time period,
indicating that other factors primarily drive lease non-use. It is
possible that our estimate of the number of unique leaseholders
is high given that multiple individual leaseholders may be
associated with the same business entity, but it is difficult to
imagine this would explain the > 60% of leases not reporting
any harvest over an entire decade. Some leases that are not
used for commercial production may be actively managed and
yield benefits for oyster propagation or Bay conservation. Such
beneficial use could include planting of shell for restoration
purposes, water quality improvements, and shoreline protection.

cultured oyster. The major contributions of this study are to
examine spatial saturation levels with respect to leased oyster
grounds in the lower Chesapeake Bay, analyze recent trends in
lease use and productivity, contrast used and non-used leases,
compare coast-wide lease productivity, and compile a unique
dataset combining lease information, oyster production, socioeconomic, and environment variables.
Despite the significant increase in leased area observed since
the mid-2000s, we found weak evidence of spatial constraints
on industry growth. Saturation of leasable areas with leases was
not a major limitation, because leased areas continue to increase
in most regions of the bay, with the notable exception of the
relatively small portion of Virginia waters in the Potomac River.
In 2016, 40–67% of theoretically leasable areas per system were
occupied by oyster leases, which was 58% of overall leasable area
across systems (when excluding the mainstem of the Chesapeake
Bay). These estimates are likely conservative as some areas may
not be optimal for certain types of aquaculture according to
bottom type and current velocity. For example, though large
areas of the mainstem of the Chesapeake Bay theoretically remain
available for leasing (only about 10% of leasable areas in the
mainstem are occupied by leases), those areas are generally far
from shore, relatively deep, and heavily used for boat traffic,
making them less attractive for leasing due to the added costs
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TABLE 4 | Comparisons between used and non-used leases according to proxy variables related to either “Not in my backyard” attitude (NIMBY), economic,
speculation, congestion, or environment conditions.
Proxies

Variables

Wilcoxon test
p-value

Production scale

Economic

Speculation

Congestion

p-value

Signif.

Lease size

<2.2e-16

***

+

0.11

NS

<2.2e-16

***

+

0.51

NS

Total leased area from leaseholder

<2.2e-16

***

+

0.65

NS

1.1e-8

***

–

Proximity to shore

0.12

NS

(–)

0.0003

***

Proximity to leaseholder ZIP code

0.09

.

+

0.002

**

Average income

7.9e-7

***

–

0.04

*

Population density

1.6e-5

***

–

0.04

*

Household density

2.1e-6

***

–

0.19

NS

Proportional rank of purchase

9.3e-13

***

–

0.0006

***

Cumulative area

4.2e-16

***

–

1.1e-9

***

Lease age

0.0005

***

–b

0.04

*

0.15

NS

(+)

0.81

NS

Fraction of leased area other leasehold
Lease number from other leaseholder

0.03

*

+

0.53

NS

Fraction of leased area same leasehold

0.003

**

+

0.33

NS

Lease number from same leaseholder

0.01

*

+

0.01

*

<2.2e-16

***

+

0.01

*

Salinity

0.002

**

–

1.5e-5

***

Depth

5.6e-15

***

+

0.35

NS

0.003

**

–

0.05

.

Proximity to Baylor grounds
Environment

Signif.

A. Bradley test

Number of leases from leaseholder
Only one leasea
NIMBY

Lease use

Proximity to SAV

The Wilcoxon test compared independent samples of used leases’ and non-used leases’ central tendencies while the Ansari–Bradley test compared the equivalence of
their variances. Variance trends are indicated for non-used leases. Significance is denoted by: p < 0.001 = “***”, p < 0.01 = “**”, p < 0.05 = “*”, p < 0.1 = “.”. ± indicates
differences of used as compared to non-used leases. Parentheses around sign indicate trend for non-significant relationship. a A Pearson’s chi-squared test was used to
assess the independence between lease use and variable “Only_one_lease.” b Relationship between lease use and lease age was positive when all leases were considered
for the analysis (including less than three year old leases).

appeared to be driven by local conditions that might vary across
leases or leaseholders, but for which specific covariates were not
included in the model.
The type of aquaculture (intensive or extensive) did not
significantly affect productivity. Intensive aquaculture practices
(cages, rack and bags, and floats) are used to raise a high density
of oysters in a small area, and so it was expected that this
type of aquaculture would exhibit higher productivity (lbs/ac)
when compared to extensive, on-bottom practices. Conversely,
productivity differences observed across states corresponded to
typical aquaculture practices used in those states; e.g., it was
generally lower in states with extensive culture (LA) and higher
in states with more intensive culture (MA) (sources in Table 5).
This difference was less evident in VA which has substantial levels
of both practices. Negligible differences in productivity across
aquaculture type in VA may be due to smaller portions of leases
being used for intensive oyster production in an effort to reduce
competition via a buffer zone.
There were clear differences between used and non-used leases
in the central tendencies of nearly all economic, social, and
environmental variables, though variances were generally similar.
Variables related to speculation behavior, such as proportional
rank of purchase, were found to differ significantly between
used and non-used leases. This is consistent with leaseholders
frequently buying more leased area than needed, perhaps due to
the low cost of holding a lease. Leaseholders with only one small

Our estimates did not consider these types of beneficial uses;
however, state resource managers are currently working to refine
their definition of use to include non-commercial activities
(Office of the Secretary of Natural Resources, 2018).
Although the numbers of used leases per year were low, the
probability of lease use and productivity per lease increased
over years. The increased rate of use in the James River was
lower than in other systems, likely due to higher use rates
in earlier years of the analysis (∼21% of leases were used in
the James in 2006, whereas less than 4% of leases were used
in all other systems, Supplementary Figure S2A). The James
River has historically supported, and continues to support,
large public and private oyster fisheries, including public “seed
beds” for collection of seed by private planters (Haven et al.,
1981; Schulte, 2017). In the Potomac River, results from the
saturation model suggest viable space for leasing has become
scarce, which might have incentivized increased use of existing
leases (which are smaller in this system, ∼16.8 ac, compared
to ∼40 ac in the James or York Rivers). Interestingly, lease
age significantly negatively affected the probability of lease
use (older leases tended to be used slightly less) but did not
affect lease productivity. The majority of variance explained
in the mixed effects models of lease use and productivity
was not related to broad spatial or temporal variables, but
rather indicates considerable heterogeneity across leases and
leaseholders. Therefore, lease use decisions and productivity
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FIGURE 7 | Used lease percentages according to lease size bins (A); differences between used leases and non-used leases in averaged proportional rank of
purchase (B), per household income (C), and proximity to SAV (D). Proportional rank of purchase was calculated as the ratio of the rank of lease acquisition divided
by the number of leases owned by the same leaseholder in a given year. Average household income was estimated as the total adjusted gross income for a ZIP
code divided by the number of tax returns. Proximity to SAV was calculated as the distance between the nearest SAV bed polygon and a lease.
TABLE 5 | Oyster production, farm gate value, leased area, and number of leases for U.S. East and Gulf coast states with significant oyster aquaculture industries.
State

Production (oyster pieces) Farm gate value ($) Leased area (acre) Lease number Productivity (oysters/acre) Aquacultured species

Massachusetts

47,849,698

27,015,107

1,299

390

36,836

Rhode Island

8,434,541

5,771,436

296a

73a

28,495

O, C, M

Maine

10,716,197

7,193,925

676

82

15,852

O, C, M, U, S

Texas

35,969,750

5,216,507

2,321b

43b

15,498

O

North Carolina

23,274,000

2,400,000

1,837

278

12,670

O, C

New Hampshire
Maryland
Florida

O, C, M, S, Q

329,156

246,441

56a

25a

5,878

O

22,219,800

6,000,000

6,803

420c

3,266

O, C
O, C

2,193,107

–

1,556

1,384

1,409

Louisiana

227,737,226

–

403,383

8,028

565

O

Connecticut

31,128,300c

16,306,096

60,000

1,590

519

O, C

Virginia

38,900,000

15,900,000

125,928d

4,694d

309

O, C

New Jersey

2,029,500e

1,370,060e

37,368

1,742

54

O, C

Data are for 2017, ordered by descending productivity. Aquacultured species on leases could be oyster (O), clam (C), mussel (M), quahog (Q), urchin (U), or scallop
(S). –Data unavailable. a Not exclusive leases (can be used for many other uses in RI; by different leaseholders in NH). b Certificates of location; location holders plant
cultch onto their locations and manage the growth of oysters that naturally recruit to this substrate. c Data for 2018. d Does not include riparian leases. e Data for 2016.
Sources: MA Division of Marine Fisheries 2017 Annual Report; D. Beutel, RI Coastal Resources Management Council; M. Nelson, ME Department of Marine Resources,
Aquaculture Division; L. Robinson, TX Parks and wildlife Department, Coastal Fisheries Division; C. Weirich, NC Sea Grant, Marine Aquaculture; C. Nash, NH Department
of Environmental Services and R. Atwood, NH Fish and Game Department; K. Roscher, MD Department of Natural Resources, Fishing and Boating Services and MD
Aquaculture Coordinating Council annual report for 2018; C. Culpepper, FL Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Aquaculture. 2019. Internal
Data; J. Tomko, NJ Department of Environmental Protection; C. Bourque, LA Department of Wildlife and Fisheries; D. Carey, CT Department of Agriculture, Bureau of
Aquaculture; B. Stagg, VA Marine Resource Commission.

lease tended not to use it; these may be speculators or property
owners. With the present data, the relationship between the age
of a lease and its use was not obvious. Contrary to expectations,
and similarly to what was found in the mixed model on lease
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use, non-used leases tended to be older. We further explored this
effect by adding a dummy variable to the model that was 1 if
the lease had any extensive harvest when the lease was younger
than three years old. This variable had a negative impact on use
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socioeconomic benefits were perceived by the community
(Katranidis et al., 2003). Thus, it may be necessary to better
communicate to Virginia’s local communities the annual
economic impacts from oyster aquaculture, such as the creation
of hundreds of jobs, and the farm gate value of $15.9 million
generated in 2017 (Hudson, 2018). Additionally, by diminishing
excess anthropogenic nutrients, shellfish aquaculture can reduce
eutrophication and it was found that the total nitrogen load in
the Potomac River would be removed if 40% of the river was
used for oyster production (Bricker et al., 2014). For this blue
economy8 sector to grow, environmental and socio-economic
benefits need to be better communicated to local communities
through, for example, the extension of local farmer markets
(D’Anna and Murray, 2015) or the recently created Virginia
Oyster Trail9 . Acceptance can also be greater if stakeholders are
more involved and their preferences incorporated in decisionmaking (Byron et al., 2011).
Virginia has the lowest lease rate in the country at
$1.50/acre/year, unchanged since 1960. As of 2017, Virginia
was the third largest producer of aquacultured oysters from
private grounds on the East and Gulf Coast and had the
largest total leased area on the East Coast. Nonetheless, when
comparing across states, Virginia exhibited the second lowest
spatial productivity. The larger leased area compared to other
states possibly leads to increased conflicts and inefficiencies.
Tensions between the industry and the public have increased
substantially over the last few years, resulting in increased rates
of lease protest (a lease may be protested during the application
phase) (B. Stagg, VMRC, pers. comm.). Significant effects of
NIMBY variables at the community level are concordant with
recent public discussions of oyster leasing in Virginia. These
disputes were perhaps most pronounced in the Lynnhaven
River, where high-end real estate lines the shores of historically
fertile oyster grounds. This conflict led a state senator from
Lynnhaven to put forth a bill to increase the leasing rate from
$1.50/acre/year to $5,000/acre/year. Though this proposal was
ultimately withdrawn, it led to ongoing discussions between
managers, industry, and the public regarding potential reforms to
the leasing system to decrease underutilization by strengthening
lease use enforcement or increasing leasing fees (e.g., by
making it too costly to hold leases purely for speculation or
esthetic reasons).
Half of the states compared in our study (CT, MA, ME, MS,
NJ, VA) have subjective use, or substantial use, requirements (e.g.,
“State requires substantial use” in MA) for oyster production,
while three (NC, MD, FL) have quantitative use requirements
either in terms of annual planting or production (e.g., “Plant 25
bushels seed or 50 bushels cultch per acre; produce 10 bushels
per acre” in NC, B. Stagg, VMRC, pers. comm.). In Virginia,
the leaseholder has to provide an Oyster Lease Use Plan when
applying for a new lease, then report monthly harvest to the
Commission (Chapter 4 VAC 20-610-60). Although Virginia’s

(Supplementary Table S2), suggesting that some leaseholders
may harvest those oysters present on the bottom at the time of
lease establishment, only to later abandon production when these
resources have been fully exploited. When a lease was surrounded
by multiple leases from different leaseholders and/or closer to
Baylor (public) grounds, they tended to be used more, suggesting
that peer pressure, fear of encroachment, positive agglomeration
effects, or possibly theft (from nearby leased or public grounds)
could drive lease use. Alternatively, this could be an indication of
good growing areas for oysters (e.g., high productivity, suitable
substrate). Together, these findings indicate that differences were
systematic and that individual motivations and interactions could
affect lease use.
Though evidence supporting potential impacts of NIMBY
attitudes was limited at the lease scale, it was more obvious
at the community scale. Proximity to the shore and proximity
to leaseholder home ZIP code were not significantly different
between used and non-used leases. We used centroids of
leaseholder ZIP codes as a proxy for distance, due to the high
frequency of PO boxes in leaseholder addresses, which may
have limited our ability to detect differences between used and
non-used leases. There may also be compounding factors that
prevented us from seeing the NIMBY effect occurring at small
scales, such as the desire of harvesters to be close to their
leases to facilitate surveillance against poaching and harvesting
itself. Non-used leases were found to be in shallower areas,
or nearby to SAV, possibly indicating close proximity to the
shore (even though this variable was not significantly different
between used and non-used leases). Despite limited evidence
of NIMBY at the lease scale, non-used leases were found
in more populated, high-income regions. We demonstrated
weak evidence of possible NIMBY behavior, as correlated with
factors others have suggested influence these attitudes (primarily
income; Dear, 1992). NIMBY attitudes, or public opposition, has
been often associated with fish farming that can cause negative
impacts on the environment (e.g., fish waste products, water
eutrophication, Katranidis et al., 2003; Whitmarsh and Palmieri,
2009). A few studies have documented public opposition toward
shellfish aquaculture development through perception surveys of
coastal homeowners (Shafer et al., 2010; D’Anna and Murray,
2015; Knapp and Rubino, 2016; Ryan et al., 2017). Negative
esthetic features such as buoys, cages and lease boundary
markers, pollution with gear debris, noise nuisance, hazards
for recreational uses, and restriction of public access have all
been recurring perceptions of shellfish aquaculture that could
explain potential NIMBY attitudes in Virginia. One may fear
that shellfish aquaculture externalities would diminish property
values; however, such negative impacts are not evident (Evans
et al., 2017; Ryan et al., 2017).
Community and stakeholder preferences could be evaluated
in Virginia to better understand speculation and NIMBY
attitudes (see D’Anna and Murray, 2015; Dalton et al., 2017;
Ryan et al., 2017 for studies of preferences in other systems)
and the positive benefits from shellfish aquaculture should
be effectively communicated to increase social acceptance
(Bricknell and Langston, 2013). Acceptance of sea-bream and
sea bass aquaculture activities in Greece was greater when
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Blue economy is “the sustainable use of the ocean resources for economic growth,
improved livelihoods, and jobs while preserving health of ocean ecosystem”
(Silver et al., 2015).
9
http://virginiaoystertrail.com
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potential social interactions and user conflicts (e.g., based on local
population, lease congestion, and length of coastline adjacent
to aquaculture activities). Coastal spatial planning processes
in Virginia could follow a participatory approach to include
local communities in addition to industry representatives,
and could be supported by hearings to consider potential
reforms to the leasing system (Byron et al., 2011; SanchezJerez et al., 2016). The existing AVM is a unique tool used to
assess biological suitability that was developed in a relatively
data-rich environment. Use of aquaculture siting tools that
incorporate both biological and socio-economic information
should be considered in Virginia as well as other areas with
expanding aquaculture sectors, especially where such data are
readily available.

leases are technically “use it or lose it,” with a subjective use
requirement, in practice fairly minimal evidence is required to
demonstrate use, and enforcement mechanisms are largely absent
(Beck et al., 2004). Historically, use has been hard to verify
(Mason, 2008), especially given that leaseholders can claim the
prevalence of the pathogens MSX and Dermo on their sites,
impeding production, without having to provide proof of their
presence. Maryland has, in recent years, implemented a strict
“use it or lose it” policy that returned unproductive leases to
the state, some of which were later leased by productive growers
(Green and Tracy, 2013). Shellfish production in Maryland
has since increased from about 5,000 bushels/year in 2009 to
about 75,000 bushels/year by 2017. Virginia would likely benefit
from a stricter “use it or lose it” policy or by setting annual
quantitative production or investment requirements, such as a
minimum number of bushels per leased acre or evidence of
seed purchase by leaseholders. A newly formed sub-committee
at VMRC, the Aquaculture Management Advisory Committee,
is currently discussing stricter use requirements, while VMRC
staff have begun using a standard of 1 bushel/acre/year as a
minimum requirement. The Commission has also recently (2019)
established a renewal fee ($150 per lease per 10 years, Chapter
4 VAC 20-1350-10 ET SEQ.), increased application and transfer
fees (from $300 to $1,000 per lease, depending on lease size),
and now has the authority to deny a transfer. These changes
in fees should help ensure that leaseholders are committed to
fully utilizing leased acreage. The commission also requested that
oyster leases and active work areas be better defined and marked
(Chapter 4 VAC 20-290-10 ET SEQ., 2016).
There is an urgent need for coastal spatial planning to
ensure sustainable aquaculture development in the region
(Sanchez-Jerez et al., 2016). Given evidence for the continuing
expansion of leased areas, in combination with the finding
that only ∼33% of leases being used for oyster production,
and indications of NIMBY behavior at the community level,
better zoning would balance working waterfronts, recreational
areas, places of residence, and aquaculture spaces, thereby
minimizing conflicting interactions between users and avoiding
negative externalities (Aguilar-Manjarrez et al., 2017; Lombard
et al., 2019). As part of this process, physical, ecological, and
socio-economic criteria should be considered (Sanchez-Jerez
et al., 2016; Evans et al., 2017). Despite the development
of tools evaluating environmental and production carrying
capacity, the use of these models combined with socialeconomic variables has been modest (Smaal and van Duren,
2019). In New Zealand, aquaculture can only be developed
in Aquaculture Management Areas (AMAs; Shafer et al.,
2010). There, Longdill et al. (2008) suggested, among many
other suitability criteria, a 5 km buffer from the coast
to reduce the potential for coastal homeowners to view
aquaculture structures. The Aquaculture Vulnerability Model
(AVM; Center for Coastal Resources Management [CCRM],
2015) was developed to assist shellfish growers in identifying
locations where current conditions could support aquaculture
operations in Virginia. However, this model uses only physical,
biological, and landscape (dominant land use) attributes to
evaluate area suitability and does not presently include socioeconomic criteria. The model could be extended to accommodate
Frontiers in Marine Science | www.frontiersin.org

CONCLUSION
Given increasing populations, increasing seafood consumption
per capita, and limited ability of wild stocks to produce
substantially more, aquaculture production is expected to
continue expanding (Duarte et al., 2009; Science Advice for
Policy by European Academies [SAPEA], 2017; Wijsman et al.,
2019). Demographic shifts leading to increased wealthy nonworking (retired) individuals or vacationers in already crowded
coastal regions will heighten barriers for coastal aquaculture
development in the United States and elsewhere (Halpern
et al., 2008; Gibbs, 2009). In Virginia, it is apparent from this
study that there are numerous social inefficiencies and spatial
conflicts regarding oyster private lease use. Whether they are
due to NIMBY attitudes, speculation, or creation of buffer
zones, these social attitudes and economic conditions appear
to be associated with inefficiencies and non-use in the oyster
aquaculture sector. Nevertheless, the precise mechanisms by
which these socio-economic factors lead to lower productivity
require further exploration in future research. Use rates and
lease productivity are low in Virginia, both in absolute terms
and relative to other states. With the lowest lease rates in
the country, lengthy leasing periods, and poor enforcement,
there is little cost to holding a lease and it is not surprising
that 67% of leases went unused over the entire decade. This
study is the first to quantitatively evaluate recent lease use and
underutilization, including potential modulators of this behavior.
Our findings recognize that social and institutional constraints
may slow growth and exacerbate stakeholder conflicts while
confirming that incentives matter in lease use decisions. There
is potential room for growth in the oyster aquaculture industry
if social constraints are reduced, existing leased areas are used
more efficiently, and production expands into regions with
low conflict and higher operational costs; e.g., the mainstem
of Chesapeake Bay. To achieve this, utilization requirements
should be enforced and strictly monitored, and zoning for
aquaculture activity should be developed. Virginia’s long history
of oyster production and mature leasing system may provide
useful guidance to states in more nascent stages of development.
For example, Rhode Island’s system is relatively new and
Maryland has made several changes to its leasing system
based on Virginia’s program (Green and Tracy, 2013). It is
16
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important that lessons are learnt from this system so that similar
challenges and conflicts are reduced in Virginia and avoided
in other regions.
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